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Abstract
In a recent paper, Thomson and Yeh [Operators for the adjudication of conflicting
claims, Journal of Economic Theory 143 (2008) 177-198] introduced the concept of opera-
tors on the space of rules for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims. They focussed
on three operators in order to uncover the structure of such a space. In this paper, we
generalize their analysis upon presenting and studying a general family of operators in-
spired by three apparently unrelated approaches to the problem of adjudicating conflicting
claims. We study the structural properties of this family and show, in particular, that most
of Thomson and Yeh’s results are specific cases of our study.
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1 Introduction
The problem of adjudicating conflicting claims describes a situation in which an arbitrator has
to allocate a given amount of a perfectly divisible (and homogeneous) resource among a group
of agents when the available amount is not enough to fully honor their claims. Most rationing
problems can be given this form (e.g., the division of an estate that is insufficient to cover all
the debts incurred by the deceased, the collection of a given tax from taxpayers, sharing the
cost of a public facility). The reader is referred to Moulin (2002) or Thomson (2003) for reviews
of the sizable related literature initiated by O’Neill (1982). In most of this literature the aim is
to single out rules that assign for each problem an allocation indicating how much each agent
obtains. A recent study by Thomson and Yeh (2008) uncovers the structure of the space of
rules upon studying operators on such a space. An operator is a mapping on the space of rules
that associates with each rule another one. Thomson and Yeh (2008) consider three operators.
First, the duality operator, which assigns to each rule R, its dual (Rd), that allocates awards
in the same way as R allocates losses. Second, the so-called claims truncation operator, which
assigns to each rule R the rule Rt defined, for each problem, by applying R after each claim
has been truncated at the available amount. Third, the attribution of minimal rights operator,
which associates with each rule R the rule Rm defined by the following two-step procedure. For
each problem, first each agent receives her minimal right (to be understood as the part of the
available amount that remains, if anything, when all other agents have been fully honored);
second, each agent gets an award according to R applied to the revised problem obtained by
reducing agents’ claims by their minimal burdens, and the available amount by the sum of
the minimal rights. Thomson and Yeh (2008) establish a number of results linking them and
determine which properties of rules are preserved under each of these operators, and which are
not.
In this paper, we generalize the analysis of Thomson and Yeh (2008) upon providing a sys-
tematic analysis of a family of operators generalizing the last two mentioned above. Our family
is inspired by three apparently unrelated approaches to the problem of adjudicating conflict-
ing claims that, as we shall see later, are intimately connected. First, the so-called baseline
rationing, a generalization of the benchmark model upon adding a vector in the awards space
representing some reference point, or baseline, judged relevant to the division (see Hougaard et
al., (2010) for further details). Second, two of the principles most frequently employed in the
literature on the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, pertaining to the way rules react
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to tentative allocations of the available amount, and known as composition properties (e.g.,
Young, 1988; Moulin, 2000). Third, the analysis of lower bounds, an important aspect within
the theory of fair allocation, (e.g., Thomson, 2007) that has only been recently explored for the
problem of adjudicating conflicting claims (e.g., Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2004; Dominguez
and Thomson, 2006).
More precisely, think of the following situation: after having divided the allocation of the
available amount among its creditors, it turns out that the actual value of the amount is
larger than was initially assumed. Then, two options are open: either the tentative division
is canceled altogether and the actual problem is solved, or we add to the initial distribution
the result of applying the rule to the remaining amount. The requirement of composition up is
that both ways of proceeding should result in the same awards vectors. Think now of the dual
case. Namely, after having divided the available amount among its creditors one finds that
the actual value of the amount to divide falls short of what was assumed. Here again we can
ignore the initial division and apply the rule to the revised problem, or we can apply the rule
to the problem in which the initial claims are substituted by the (unfeasible) allocation initially
proposed. The requirement of composition down is that both ways of proceeding should result
in the same awards vectors.
A simple examination of the two composition principles described above will suffice to de-
tect a close relationship between the attribution of minimal rights operator and the principle of
composition up, and the claims truncation operator and the principle of composition down, re-
spectively. In the former case, one just needs to interpret minimal rights as a baseline reflecting
the tentative allocation of the available amount, whereas in the latter case, truncated claims
would refer to a baseline reflecting the unfeasible allocation initially proposed. We propose in
this paper a family of operators to generalize those two upon associating to each baseline an
operator reflecting the composition principles with respect to it.
In other words, all operators within our family will share a common feature inspired by
the composition properties. Namely, if all (individual) baselines cannot be granted, then no
agent will be awarded above her baseline. Similarly, if all baselines could be granted, then each
agent will be at least awarded with her baseline. More precisely, each rule will be mapped into
a new rule that will solve problems according to a two-stage process, depending on whether
the available amount in each problem is above or falls short the aggregate baseline for that
problem. In the former case, and inspired by the axiom of composition up, the resulting rule
assigns first to each agent her baseline and then adds to that distribution the result of applying
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the original rule to the remaining amount, once claims have been adjusted. In the latter case,
and inspired by the axiom of composition down, the resulting rule solves each problem upon
applying the original rule to the problem in which the initial claims are substituted by the
(unfeasible) allocation proposed by the baselines profile.
As one can easily infer, both the claims truncation operator, and the attribution of minimal
rights operator are specific members of the family of (baseline) composition operators described
above. We shall study some logical relations among the operators within this family, as well as
a number of results linking them, and determine which properties of rules are preserved under
each of these operators, and which are not. In doing so, we shall generalize and scrutinize the
results by Thomson and Yeh (2008). We shall also provide a thorough study of some other
focal members of the family.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and basic
definitions. In Section 3, we introduce the family of composition operators. In Section 4, we
relate the operators by means of several relationships among them. In Section 5, we explore
the preservation of axioms under these operators.
2 Model and basic concepts
2.1 The benchmark framework
We study claims problems in a variable population model. The set of potential claimants, or
agents, is identified with the set of natural numbers N. Let N be the set of finite subsets of
N, with generic element N . We denote by RN+ the cross-product of |N | copies of R+ indexed
by the members of N .1 For each i ∈ N , let ci ∈ R+ be i’s claim and c ≡ (ci)i∈N the claims
profile.2 A problem is a triple consisting of a population N ∈ N , a claims profile c ∈ RN+ ,
and an amount to be divided E ∈ R+ such that
∑
i∈N ci ≥ E. Let C ≡
∑
i∈N ci. To avoid
unnecessary complication, we assume C > 0. Let DN be the set of problems with population
N and D ≡ ⋃N∈N DN .
1Alternatively, the superscript N may refer to a set pertaining to the agents in N . Whichever interpretation
is intended should be unambiguous from the context.
2For each N ∈ N , each M ⊆ N , and each z ∈ RN , let zM ≡ (zi)i∈M .
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2.2 Rules
Given a problem (N, c, E) ∈ D, an allocation is a vector x ∈ RN satisfying that for each i ∈ N ,
0 ≤ xi ≤ ci (boundedness) and
∑
i∈N xi = E (balancedness). A rule on D, R : D →
⋃
N∈N RN ,
associates with each problem (N, c, E) ∈ D an allocation R (N, c, E) for the problem. Some
classical rules are the constrained equal-awards rule, A, which selects the allocation that
makes awards as equal as possible, subject to the condition that no agent gets more than her
claim, and the constrained equal-losses rule, L, which selects the allocation that makes losses
as equal as possible, subject to the condition that no agent gets a negative amount. Formally,
A (N, c, E) = (min{ci, λ})i∈N , and L (N, c, E) = (max{0, ci − λ})i∈N , where λ > 0 is chosen,
in each case, so that the balancedness condition is guaranteed. Two other prominent rules are
the proportional rule, P , which awards agents proportionally to claims, and the Talmud
rule (e.g., Aumann and Maschler, 1985), which is a compromise between the constrained equal-
awards and the constrained equal-losses rules. Formally, T (N, c, E) = (min{1
2
ci, λ})i∈N if
E ≤ 1
2
C and (max{1
2
ci, ci−µ})i∈N if E ≥ 12C, where λ and µ are chosen so that the balancedness
condition is guaranteed.
2.3 Operators
An operator is a mapping on the space of rules that associates with each rule another one.
Three operators have been proposed in the literature (e.g., Thomson and Yeh, 2008). The first
one, amounts to the concept of duality. For any given rule R, the dual rule of R, denoted as
Rd, associates with each (N, c, E) ∈ D, Rd(N, c, E) ≡ c−R(N, c, C −E). A rule is self-dual if
it coincides with its dual. It is straightforward to see that the constrained equal awards and the
constrained equal losses are dual rules and that the proportional and the Talmud are self-dual
rules, i.e., Ad = L, P d = P , T d = T . The duality operator Od is the operator assigning to each
rule R its dual rule, i.e., Od(R) = Rd. Note that the duality operator is an involution, i.e.,
Od(Od(R)) = R.
The second one refers to the concept of truncated claims. In some claims problems, it makes
sense to postulate that the part of a claim that is above the amount to divide should be ignored.
For a given problem (N, c, E), we denote by t(N,E, c) its corresponding vector of truncated
claims, i.e., t(N,E, c) = (ti(N, c, E))i∈N , where ti(N, c, E) = min{E, ci} for all i ∈ N . The
claims truncation operator Ot is the operator assigning to each rule R the rule arising from
applying R to each problem once claims have been truncated. Formally, Ot(R) = Rt, where
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Rt(N, c, E) = R(N, t(N,E, c), E), for all problems (N, c, E).
The third one refers to the concept of minimal rights. Somewhat polar to the previous idea
is the principle that a minimal amount should be ensured for each agent. The most natural
amount, for each agent i, would be mi(N, c, E) = max{0, E−
∑
j∈N\{i} cj}, which is the portion
of the amount to divide that is left to her when the claims of all other agents are fully honored,
provided this amount is nonnegative. We interpret this amount as the minimal right of agent
i. Let m(N, c, E) = (mi(N, c, E))i∈N and M(N, c, E) =
∑
i∈N mi(N, c, E). The attribution
of minimal rights operator Om is the operator assigning to each rule R the rule arising from
allocating minimal rights first and applying then R to the resulting problem once claims (and
the available amount) have been adjusted. Formally, Om(R) = Rm, where Rm(N, c, E) =
m(N, c, E) +R(N, c−m(N,E, c), E −M(N, c, E)), for all problems (N, c, E).
2.4 Baselines
A baseline is a mapping associating to each problem a vector satisfying the boundedness con-
dition, but not necessarily the balancedness condition. Formally, b : D → ⋃N∈N RN , asso-
ciates with each problem (N, c, E) ∈ D a vector b (N, c, E) such that 0 ≤ bi (N, c, E) ≤ ci
for all i ∈ N .3 We single out two important types of baselines. A lower bound on D,
b : D → ⋃N∈N RN , is a baseline that associates with each problem (N, c, E) ∈ D a fea-
sible vector. Formally,
∑
i bi (N, c, E) ≤ E, for all (N, c, E) ∈ D. On the other hand,
an upper bound on D, b : D → ⋃N∈N RN , is a baseline that associates with each problem
(N, c, E) ∈ D an unfeasible vector. Formally, ∑i bi (N, c, E) ≥ E, for all (N, c, E) ∈ D. An
instance of a lower bound is the minimal rights application described above, whereas an in-
stance of an upper bound is the truncated claims application also described above. Another
interesting instance of lower bound is the one that assigns to each agent one n-th of her trun-
cated claim (e.g., Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2004). Formally, µ(N, c, E) = (µi(N, c, E))i∈N ,
where µi(N, c, E) = 1nti(N, c, E) =
1
n
min{ci, E}.4 The corresponding upper bound is obtained
when requiring that if agent i’s claim is at most as large as the deficit C − E, she should
receive at most ci− 1nci, and otherwise, she should receive at most ci−
1
n
(C−E). Formally,
µˆ(N, c, E) = (µˆi(N, c, E))i∈N , where µˆi(N, c, E) = ci− 1nti(N, c, C−E) = ci− 1n min{ci, C−E}.
3See Hougaard et al., (2010) for an alternative modeling of baseline rationing in which baselines are considered
as arbitrary and exogenously given.
4Note that using claims instead of truncated claims while defining the bound is not a meaningful option, as
the bounds so obtained would not necessarily be feasible for all problems.
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Other lower bounds that will play a role in the analysis of this paper are the so-called
proportional lower bounds, which assign to each agent a fixed portion of the proportional al-
location. Formally, for each α ∈ (0, 1), ρα(N, c, E) = αE
C
c. The corresponding (proportional)
upper bounds are easily obtained: ρˆα(N, c, E) = (1−α)C+αE
C
c.
It might well be the case that a baseline is neither a lower bound nor an upper bound.
Instances are those baselines that do not depend on the available amount. A focal example will
be the case in which baselines are a given percentage of claims. Formally, for each θ ∈ (0, 1),
θ (N, c, E) = θc, for all (N, c, E) ∈ D.
3 Composition Operators
We now introduce the concept of a composition operator. More precisely, for a given baseline
b, the composition operator Ob is the operator assigning to each rule R the rule Rb arising
from composing the tentative allocation of b with the allocation that R proposes for the revised
problem. Formally,
Rb (N, c, E) =
 R(N, b(N, c, E), E) if E ≤
∑
i bi(N, c, E)
b(N, c, E) +R(N, c− b(N, c, E), E −∑i bi(N, c, E)) if E ≥∑i bi(N, c, E)
(1)
A straightforward consequence of (1) is that Rb yields allocations satisfying xi ≤ bi(N, c, E)
for all i ∈ N if and only if E ≤∑i bi(N, c, E), and xi ≥ bi(N, c, E) for all i ∈ N if and only if
E ≥∑ bi(N, c, E). In words, Rb imposes a rationing of the same sort for each individual and
the whole society according to the profile of baselines.
It can be argued that Rb rations agents relative to the feasible or unfeasible baselines in the
spirit of composition up and down respectively. More precisely, if b is a feasible baseline (i.e.,
a lower bound), then
Rb (N, c, E) = b(N, c, E) +R(N, c− b(N, c, E), E −
∑
i∈N
bi(N, c, E)),
as in the spirit of composition up, where Rb first allocates b and then allocates the residual
amount using the rule R with respect to residual claims c− b.
If b is an unfeasible baseline (i.e., an upper bound), then
Rb (N, c, E) = R(N, b(N, c, E), E),
as in the spirit of composition down, where Rb allocates E by using the rule R with respect to
the baseline itself.
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The following lemma, whose straightforward proof we omit, shows that the minimal rights
operator and the claims truncation operator are specific instances of composition operators.
Lemma 1 The following statements hold:
• If b(N, c, E) = m(N, c, E) for all (N, c, E) ∈ D, then Ob ≡ Om.
• If b(N, c, E) = t(N, c, E) for all (N, c, E) ∈ D, then Ob ≡ Ot.
As mentioned above, a natural class of baselines arises when baselines profiles are assumed to
be a given percentage of claims, i.e., for some θ ∈ (0, 1), b(N,E, c) = θc, for all (N, c, E) ∈ D. It
turns out that the proportional rule is a fixed point for each of the corresponding composition
operators {Oθ}θ∈(0,1). Formally, Oθ(P ) = P , for all θ ∈ (0, 1).5 As for the specific case in
which θ = 1/2, which could be interpreted as a psychological threshold, the other two classical
rules (namely, the constrained equal awards and the constrained equal losses rules) also provide
interesting outcomes. More precisely, it is straightforward to show that O1/2(A) would precisely
be the so-called Piniles rule (e.g., Thomson, 2003), whereas O1/2(L) would be its dual rule.
4 Relating operators
4.1 Duality relationships
We now relate some of the composition operators described above. Note first that, as the
duality operator is an involution, then R is the dual of S if and only if S is the dual of R.
Hence, if R is the dual of S we can refer to R and S as dual rules.
We now define the concept of a dual baseline. Formally, for a given baseline b, we define its
dual b̂ by
b̂(N, c, E) = c− b(N, c, C − E). (2)
In words, as it happens with rules, the baseline b̂ allocates awards in the same way as baseline
b allocates losses. It is straightforward to see that the dual of a lower bound is an upper
bound and vice versa. Note also that E ≥∑ bi (N, c, E) is equivalent to saying that C − E ≤∑
b̂i (N, c, C − E) . Then, we have the following result:
Theorem 1 Let R and S be dual rules. Then Rb and S b̂ are dual rules.
5That is also the case for the proportional bounds operators {Oρα}α∈(0,1) and {Oρˆα}α∈(0,1).
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Proof. We need to show that for each (N, c, E), Rb (N, c, E) = c − S b̂ (N, c, C − E). We
distinguish two cases.
Case 1: E ≤∑i∈N bi (N, c, E).
In this case, Rb (N, c, E) = R (N, b(N, c, E), E) and
c− S b̂ (N, c, C − E) = c− b̂ (N, c, C − E)− S
(
N, c− b̂ (N, c, C − E) , C − E −
∑
i∈N
b̂i (N, c, C − E)
)
= b(N, c, E)− S(N, b(N, c, E),
∑
i∈N
bi(N, c, E)− E).
Now, as R and S are dual rules, it follows that
R (N, b(N, c, E), E) = b(N, c, E)− S
(
N, b(N, c, E),
∑
i∈N
bi (N, c, E)− E
)
.
Thus, Rb (N, c, E) = c− S b̂ (N, c, C − E), as desired.
Case 2: E ≥∑i∈N bi (N, c, E).
In this case,
Rb (N, c, E) = b (N, c, E) +R(N, c− b (N, c, E) , E −
∑
i∈N
bi (N, c, E)),
and
c− S b̂ (N, c, C − E) = c− S
(
N, b̂ (N, c, C − E) , C − E
)
= c− S (N, c− b(N, c, E), C − E) .
Now, as R and S are dual rules, it follows that
R(N, c− b (N, c, E) , E −
∑
i∈N
bi (N, c, E)) = c− b (N, c, E)− S (N, c− b (N, c, E) , C − E) ,
from where the desired equality follows.
Theorem 1 says, in particular, that if R is a self-dual rule, then Rb and Rb̂ are dual rules.
Somewhat related, we also have that if b is a given baseline, S is a rule such that Sb is self-dual,
and R is the dual rule of S, then Rbˆ ≡ Sb.
It is straightforward to see that the truncated claims application and the minimal rights
application are dual baselines, i.e., t̂ = m and m̂ = t. We then have the following corollary,
which corresponds to Theorems 1 and 5 in Thomson and Yeh (2008).
Corollary 1 Let R and S be two dual rules. Then, Rm and St are dual rules.
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Other similar corollaries can also be obtained as straightforward consequences of the above
theorem.
Corollary 2 Let R and S be two dual rules. Then,
• Rµ and Sµˆ are dual rules.
• Rρα and S ρˆα are dual rules.
• Rθ and S1−θ are dual rules.6
4.2 Commutative relationships
We now turn to explore how composition operators behave when they are applied sequentially.
More precisely, our next result shows that the composition operators corresponding to two dual
baselines commute, provided they satisfy an additional condition. Formally, let b be a lower
bound. We say that b is duality stable if
b(N, b̂ (N, c, E) , E) = b(N, c, E),
for all (N, c, E) ∈ D. Then, we have the following:
Theorem 2 If a lower bound is duality stable then the composition operator Ob commutes with
the composition operator Ob̂, i.e., for each rule R,
Ob̂(Ob(R(N, c, E))) = Ob(Ob̂(R(N, c, E))).
Proof. Let R be a given rule and (N, c, E) ∈ D a given problem.
On the one hand, we have that
Ob̂(Ob(R(N, c, E))) = Rb(N, b̂ (N, c, E) , E)
= b(N, b̂ (N, c, E) , E) (3)
+ R(N, b̂ (N, c, E)− b(N, b̂ (N, c, E) , E), E −
∑
i∈N
bi(N, b̂ (N, c, E) , E)).
On the other hand, we have that
Ob(Ob̂(R(N, c, E))) = b(N, c, E) +Rb̂(N, c− b (N, c, E) , E −
∑
i∈N
bi(N, c, E))
= b(N, c, E) (4)
+ R(N, b̂
(
N, c− b(N, c, E), E −
∑
i∈N
bi(N, c, E)
)
, E −
∑
i∈N
bi(N, c, E)).
6In particular, if R is a self-dual rule then R1/2 is self-dual too.
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It follows from (2) that
b̂
(
N, c− b(N, c, E), E −
∑
i∈N
bi(N, c, E)
)
= c− b(N, c, E)− b(N, c− b(N, c, E), C − E)
= c− b(N, c, E)− b(N, b̂(N, c, C − E), C − E)
= c− b(N, c, E)− b(N, c, C − E)
= b̂(N, c, E)− b(N, c, E).
Thus, by dual stability, both (3) and (4) are equal to
b(N, c, E) +R(N, b̂ (N, c, E)− b(N, c, E), E −
∑
i∈N
bi(N, c, E)),
which concludes the proof.
It is not difficult to show that the minimal rights lower bound is duality stable. Consequently,
we have the following corollary, which corresponds to Theorem 3 in Thomson and Yeh (2008).
Corollary 3 Om and Ot commute.
The proportional lower bounds are duality stable too. Consequently, we have that Oρα and
Oρˆ
α commute, for any α ∈ (0, 1). The lower bound µ, however, is not duality stable and,
actually, it is not difficult to show that Oµ and Oµˆ do not commute. The operators Oθ and
O1−θ do not commute either, for any θ ∈ (0, 1).
Theorem 2 can be further extended in the two-agent case for rules satisfying a mild notion
of impartiality stating that agents with equal claims are awarded equally. In order to present
that result, let us refer first to a focal principle in the two-agent case, known as concede-
and-divide, whose motivation can be traced back to the Talmud. It amounts to solve two-
agent problems upon conceding each agent a portion of the available amount and dividing
the remainder equally. A point in case for such concessions are the minimal rights described
above, but any other lower bound could be considered too. Formally, for any lower bound
b, the so-called generalized concede-and-divide rule, CDb, selects, for each two-agent problem
({i, j}, (ci, cj), E), the allocation(
bi({i, j}, (ci, cj), E) + E −B({i, j}, (ci, cj), E)
2
, bj({i, j}, (ci, cj), E) + E −B({i, j}, (ci, cj), E)
2
)
,
where B({i, j}, (ci, cj), E) = bi({i, j}, (ci, cj), E) + bj({i, j}, (ci, cj), E). The so-called concede-
and-divide rule, CD, which corresponds to the two-agent version of the Talmud rule, is obtained
when b = m.
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We now introduce an additional condition for lower bounds. Formally, let b be a lower
bound. We say that b satisfies constant duality gap if, for all (N, c, E) ∈ D,
b̂i (N, c, E)− bi (N, c, E) = b̂j (N, c, E)− bj (N, c, E) ,
for all i, j ∈ N .
The following result strengthens Theorem 2 in the two-agent case.
Theorem 3 If R is a two-agent rule satisfying equal treatment of equals, and b is a lower
bound satisfying dual stability and constant duality gap in the two-agent case, then Ob(Obˆ(R)) =
Obˆ(Ob(R)) = CDb.
Proof. Let R be a two-agent rule satisfying equal treatment of equals, and let b be a
lower bound satisfying dual stability and constant duality gap in the two-agent case. Let
({i, j}, (ci, cj), E) ∈ D be a two-agent problem. Then, by the proof of Theorem 2,
Ob̂(Ob(R ({i, j}, (ci, cj), E))) = Ob(Ob̂(R ({i, j}, (ci, cj), E))) =
b ({i, j}, (ci, cj), E) +R({i, j}, b̂ ({i, j}, (ci, cj), E)− b ({i, j}, (ci, cj), E) , E −B ({i, j}, (ci, cj), E)),
where B ({i, j}, (ci, cj), E) = bi ({i, j}, (ci, cj), E) + bj ({i, j}, (ci, cj), E). By constant duality
gap (of b) and equal treatment of equals (of R) the result follows.7
It is straightforward to show that the minimal rights lower bound satisfies constant duality
gap in the two-agent case. Consequently, we have the following corollary, which corresponds to
Theorem 2 in Thomson and Yeh (2008).
Corollary 4 If R is a two-agent rule satisfying equal treatment of equals, then Om(Ot(R)) =
Ot(Om(R)) = CD.
4.3 Fixed points and recursive iterations
Another interesting issue related to operators is to explore the rules that remain unchanged
when applied to them. A similar question has been recently addressed by Dominguez (2010)
in the specific case of lower bounds. More precisely, Dominguez (2010) shows that if a lower
bound b is continuous and satisfies positivity (i.e., for all (N, c, E) ∈ D, bi(N, c, E) ≥ 0 for all
7Note that the result could be extended to the general case of n claimants upon imposing constant duality
gap for that general case, and obtaining the rule that allocates the lower bound first and then divides the
remainder equally among all agents.
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i ∈ N , with some strict inequality), then there is a unique rule satisfying invariance under the
assignment of such lower bound (in the parlance of our paper, the composition operator Ob has
a unique fixed point, i.e., there is a unique S such that Sb = S). Furthermore, such a rule is
obtained upon applying recursively the lower bound.8 Thanks to Theorem 1, we can extend
such a result for upper bounds and baselines in general. We say that an upper bound satisfies
strictness if for all (N, c, E) ∈ D, bi(N, c, E) ≤ ci for all i ∈ N , with some strict inequality. It
is straightforward to show that a lower bound satisfies positivity if and only if its dual upper
bound satisfies strictness. The next result summarizes our findings in this section.9
Theorem 4 The following statements hold:
• If a continuous lower bound b satisfies positivity then there is a unique fixed point of Ob.
Such a fixed point is the rule obtained upon applying recursively the lower bound b.
• If a continuous upper bound b satisfies strictness then there is a unique fixed point of Ob.
Such a fixed point is the rule obtained upon applying recursively the upper bound b, and
it corresponds to the dual rule of the unique fixed point of Obˆ.
• If a continuous baseline b satisfies strictness and positivity then there is a unique fixed
point of Ob. Such a fixed point is the rule obtained upon applying recursively the baseline
b.
Proof. As mentioned above, the first statement is shown by Dominguez (2010). As for the
second statement, let b be a continuous upper bound satisfying strictness. Then, bˆ is a con-
tinuous lower bound that satisfies positivity. By the first statement, we know that there is a
unique rule S, such that S bˆ = S (and, moreover, S is the rule that is obtained by applying the
bound iteratively). Then, Od(S bˆ) = Od(S). Let R = Od(S). As R and S are dual rules, then,
by Theorem 1, so are S bˆ and Rb. Thus, Rb = Od(S bˆ) = Od(S) = R, which shows that R is
indeed the unique fixed point of Ob. It also follows, from duality, that R is the rule obtained
upon applying recursively the upper bound b. This proves the second statement. The third
one follows from the first two statements. More precisely, positivity guarantees that the resid-
ual amount to be allocated decreases for those steps in which the recursive iteration yields a
8It is worth mentioning that if positivity is dropped then the result does not hold, and the corresponding
composition operator may well have many fixed points. For instance, all rules within the TAL-family (e.g.,
Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2006) from the constrained equal losses rule to the Talmud rule are fixed points of
Om.
9Statement 1 is due to Dominguez (2010).
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feasible vector, as in the case of lower bounds; strictness guarantees that claims are reduced for
those steps in which the recursive iteration yields an unfeasible vector, as in the case of upper
bounds. Continuity concludes.
It is worth mentioning that, as with the case of positivity, strictness is necessary to guarantee
the uniqueness stated in the previous statements.10 Note that the upper bound µˆ satisfies
strictness. The unique fixed point of its corresponding composition operator is hence the dual
rule of the so-called recursive rule, introduced and analyzed by Dominguez and Thomson (2006).
Proportional lower (upper) bounds satisfy positivity (strictness). As mentioned above, the
proportional rule is a fixed point of the corresponding operators. Theorem 4 shows uniqueness.
As for the operators {Oθ}θ∈(0,1), Theorem 4 also shows that they each have a unique fixed point.
5 Preservation of axioms under composition operators
An axiom is said to be preserved under an operator if any rule that satisfies the axiom is
mapped by the operator into a rule that also satisfies the axiom. The literature has provided
a wide variety of axioms for rules reflecting ethical or operational principles. Here we shall
concentrate on those formalizing the principles of impartiality, priority, and solidarity, which
have a long tradition in the theory of justice (e.g., Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, 2006), but
also some operational (independence, strategic, and procedural) properties widely used in the
literature on the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims (e.g., Thomson, 2003).
Impartiality refers to the fact that ethically irrelevant information is excluded from the al-
location process. In this context, it is modeled by the axiom of Equal Treatment of Equals,
which requires allotting equal amounts to those agents with equal claims. Formally, a rule
R satisfies equal treatment of equals if, for all (N, c, E) ∈ D, and all i, j ∈ N, we have
Ri (N, c, E) = Rj (N, c, E) , whenever ci = cj. A strengthening of equal treatment of equals
is the requirement that the identity of agents should not matter. The chosen awards vector
should depend only on the list of claims, not on who holds them. Formally, let ΠN denote the
class of bijections from N into itself. A rule R satisfies Anonymity if, for all (N, c, E) ∈ D,
pi ∈ ΠN , and i ∈ N , Rpi(i)
(
N, (cpi(i))i∈N , E
)
= Ri (N, c, E).
10If strictness is dropped then the corresponding composition operator may well have many fixed points. For
instance, all rules within the TAL-family (e.g., Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2006) from the Talmud rule to the
constrained equal awards rule are fixed points of Ot.
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The principle of priority requires imposing a positive discrimination (albeit only to a certain
extent) towards individuals with higher needs. In this context, needs are reflected by claims
and as such, priority is modeled by the axiom of Order Preservation, which says that agents
with larger claims receive larger awards but face larger losses too. That is, ci ≥ cj implies that
Ri (N, c, E) ≥ Rj (N, c, E) and ci − Ri (N, c, E) ≥ cj − Rj (N, c, E) , for all (N, c, E) ∈ D, all
i, j ∈ N .
The principle of solidarity, with a long tradition in the axiomatic literature, can be modeled
in various related ways. Resource Monotonicity says that when there is more to be divided,
other things being equal, nobody should lose. Formally, a rule R is resource monotonic if, for
each (N, c, E) ∈ D and (N, c, E ′) ∈ D such that E ≤ E ′, then R(N, c, E) ≤ R(N, c, E ′). Claims
Monotonicity says that if an agent’s claim increases, ceteris paribus, she should receive at least
as much as she did initially. Formally, a rule R is claims monotonic if, for all (N, c, E) ∈ D and
all i ∈ N , ci ≤ c′i implies Ri(N, (ci, cN\{i}), E) ≤ Ri(N, (c′i, cN\{i}), E). The dual property says
that if an agent’s claim and the amount to divide increase by the same amount, the agent’s
award should increase by at most that amount. Formally, a rule satisfies Linked Monotonicity
if, for all (N, c, E) ∈ D and i ∈ N , Ri(N, (ci + ε, cN\{i}), E + ε) ≤ Ri(N, c, E) + ε.11
Population monotonicity is a relevant solidarity property in the context of a variable pop-
ulation. It says that if new claimants arrive, each claimant initially present should receive
at most as much as he did initially. Equivalently, if some claimants leave but there still is
not enough to honor all of the remaining claims, each remaining claimant should receive at
least as much as he did initially. Formally, R is population monotonic if for all (N, c, E) ∈ D
and (N ′, c′, E) ∈ D such that N ⊆ N ′ and c′N = c, then Ri (N ′, c′, E) ≤ Ri (N, c, E), for all
i ∈ N . The dual of population monotonicity says that if new claimants arrive and the amount
to divide increases by the sum of their claims, then each claimant initially present should re-
ceive at least as much as he did initially. Formally, a rule R satisfies Resource-and-Population
Monotonicity if for all (N, c, E) ∈ D and (N ′, c′, E) ∈ D such that N ⊆ N ′ and c′N = c, then
Ri (N, c, E) ≤ Ri
(
N ′, c′, E +
∑
N ′\N cj
)
, i ∈ N .
The next axiom also amounts to simultaneous changes in the amount available and the
population. It says that the arrival of new agents should affect all the incumbent agents
in the same direction. In other words, agents cannot benefit from a change (either in the
11For any given property α, α∗ is the dual property of α if for each rule R, R satisfies α if and only if its dual
rule R∗ satisfies α∗. A property is said to be self-dual if it coincides with its dual. Equal treatment of equals,
order preservation and resource monotonicity are instances of self-dual properties.
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available wealth or in the number of agents) if someone else suffers from it. Formally, a rule
R satisfies Resource-and-Population Uniformity if for all (N, c, E) ∈ D and (N ′, c′, E ′) ∈ D
such that N ⊆ N ′ and c′N = c, then, either Ri (N ′, c′, E ′) ≤ Ri (N, c, E), for all i ∈ N, or
Ri (N
′, c′, E ′) ≥ Ri (N, c, E), for all i ∈ N . It is straightforward to show that this axiom
implies resource monotonicity. As a matter of fact, it also satisfies the following axiom that
relates the solution of a given problem to the solutions of the subproblems that appear when
we consider a subgroup of agents as a new population and the amounts gathered in the original
problem as the available amount to be distributed. Consistency requires that the application of
the rule to each subproblem produces precisely the allocation that the subgroup obtained in the
original problem.12 More formally: A rule R is consistent if, for all (N, c, E) ∈ D, all M ⊂ N,
and all i ∈ M, we have Ri (N, c, E) = Ri(M, cM , EM), where EM =
∑
i∈M Ri(N, c, E). It
turns out that consistency and resource monotonicity together imply resource-and-population
uniformity.
We now move to a group of operational properties.
We say that a rule R satisfies Scale Invariance when if claims and amount available are
multiplied by the same positive number, then so should all awards. Formally, for all (N, c, E) ∈
D and λ ∈ R+, R(N, λc, λE) = λR(N, c, E).
We continue stating formally the two composition properties that were motivated at the in-
troduction. A rule R satisfies Composition Up if, for all (N, c, E) ∈ D and all E1, E2 ∈ R++ such
that E1+E2 = E, R(N, c, E) = R(N, c, E1)+R(N, c−R(N, c, E1), E2). It satisfies Composition
Down if, for all (N, c, E) ∈ D and all E ′ > E, we have R(N, c, E) = R(N,R(N, c, E ′), E).
Somewhat related, we state the two properties that motivated the definition of the operators
Om and Ot. A rule R satisfies Minimal Rights First if R(N, c, E) = m(N, c, E) + R(N, c −
m(N, c, E), E −∑imi(N, c, E)) = Rm(N, c, E), for all (N, c, E) ∈ D, and Claims Truncation
Invariance if R(N, c, E) = R(N, t(N, c, E), E) = Rt(N, c, E), for all (N, c, E) ∈ D. These
properties can be easily generalized to arbitrary lower and upper bounds, respectively. More
precisely, for any lower bound b, we say that a rule satisfies b-first if R(N, c, E) = b(N, c, E) +
R(N, c− b(N, c, E), E −∑i bi(N, c, E)) = Rb(N, c, E), for all (N, c, E) ∈ D. Similarly, for any
upper bound b, we say that a rule satisfies b-invariance, if R(N, c, E) = R(N, b(N, c, E), E) =
Rb(N, c, E), for all (N, c, E) ∈ D.13 It is not difficult to show that if bˆ is the dual baseline of a
12See Thomson (1996) for an excellent survey of the many applications that have been made on the idea of
consistency.
13Using a different parlance, a rule satisfies b-first if b is a lower bound and the rule is a fixed point of Ob,
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given lower bound b then b-first and bˆ-invariance are dual properties.
5.1 Direct preservation
Our next result helps to identify the preservation of some axioms.
Theorem 5 A property is preserved under the composition operator Ob if and only if its dual
property is preserved under the composition operator Ob̂.
Proof. Let P be a property that is preserved under Ob, Q its dual, and let R be a rule
satisfying Q. We need to show that Rb̂ satisfies Q. As P is dual to Q, S, the dual rule of R,
satisfies P . As P is preserved under Ob, it follows that Sb satisfies P . By Theorem 1, Sb = Rb̂,
which concludes the proof of the “if” statement. The proof of the “only if” part goes along the
same lines.
The next corollary summarizes some straightforward consequences of the above theorem.
Its first statement corresponds to Theorem 4 in Thomson and Yeh (2008).
Corollary 5 The following statements hold:
• A property is preserved under Om if and only if its dual property is preserved under Ot.
• A property is preserved under Oµ if and only if its dual property is preserved under Oµˆ.
• A property is preserved under Oρα if and only if its dual property is preserved under Oρˆα.
• A property is preserved under Oθ if and only if its dual property is preserved under O1−θ.
For arbitrary baseline profiles it is not difficult to show that almost none of the above axioms
are preserved by the composition operators. A notable exception are the so-called independence
properties that generalize the properties of minimal rights first and claims truncation invariance
described above.
Proposition 1 The following statements hold:
• If b is a lower bound then Ob preserves b-first.
• If b is an upper bound then Ob preserves b-invariance.
and b-invariance if b is an upper bound and the rule is a fixed point of Ob.
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Proof. By Theorem 5, we only need to prove one statement. Let b be an upper bound, R
a rule satisfying b-invariance, and S = Ob(R) = Rb. For any (N, c, E) ∈ D, Sb(N, c, E) =
S(N, b(N, c, E), E) = Rb(N, b(N, c, E), E). As R satisfies b-invariance, it follows that
Rb(N, b(N, c, E), E) = R(N, b(N, c, E), E) = Rb(N, c, E) = S(N, c, E).
Altogether, we have that Sb(N, c, E) = S(N, c, E), as desired.
As a consequence of the above proposition we have that Ot preserves invariance under claims
truncation, and that Om preserves minimal rights first, as proved by Thomson and Yeh (2008)
directly.
5.2 Consequent preservation
As mentioned above, most of the usual axioms are not preserved by the composition operators.
It turns out, however, that many axioms are consequently preserved. By consequent preservation
we mean that if a rule R satisfies a property P , and the baseline does that too, then Rb also
satisfies this property.
Proposition 2 Equal treatment of equals, anonymity, order preservation and scale invariance
are consequently preserved.
Proof.
Let us start with equal treatment of equals. A baseline b satisfies equal treatment of equals
if for all (N, c, E) ∈ D, and i, j ∈ N such that ci = cj then bi (N, c, E) = bj (N, c, E). Let R and
b be a rule and a baseline, respectively, satisfying equal treatment of equals. Let (N, c, E) ∈
D be given and let i, j ∈ N be such that ci = cj. Then, bi (N, c, E) = bj (N, c, E) and
ci − bi (N, c, E) = cj − bj (N, c, E) and therefore, Rbi(N, c, E) = Rbj(N, c, E).
A baseline b is anonymous if for all (N, c, E) ∈ D, pi ∈ ΠN , and i ∈ N , bpi(i)
(
N, (cpi(i))i∈N , E
)
=
bi (N, c, E). Let R and b be an anonymous rule and baseline, respectively. Let (N, c, E) ∈ D be
given and let also pi ∈ ΠN and i ∈ N be given. Then, ifE ≤∑i bi(N, c, E), Rbpi(i)(N, (cpi(i))i∈N , E) =
Rpi(i)(N, b(N, (cpi(i))i∈N , E), E) = Rpi(i)(N, (bpi(i)(N, (cpi(i))i∈N , E))i∈N , E) = Ri(N, b(N, c, E), E) =
Rbi(N, c, E). Similarly, ifE ≥
∑
i bi(N, c, E), thenR
b
pi(i)(N, (cpi(i))i∈N , E) = bpi(i)(N, (cpi(i))i∈N , E)+
Rpi(i)(N, (cpi(i)− (bi(N, (cpi(i))i∈N , E))i∈N , E−
∑
i bi(N, (cpi(i))i∈N , E)) = bi(N, c, E)) +Ri(N, (c−
b(N, c, E), E −∑i bi(N, c, E)) = Rbi(N, c, E)), as desired.
We now move to order preservation. A baseline b is order preserving if for all (N, c, E) ∈
D, and i, j ∈ N such that ci < cj then bi (N, c, E) ≤ bj (N, c, E) and ci − bi (N, c, E) ≤
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cj − bj (N, c, E). Let R and b be an order-preserving rule and baseline, respectively. Let
(N, c, E) ∈ D be given and let i, j ∈ N be such that ci < cj. Then, bi (N, c, E) ≤ bj (N, c, E)
and ci − bi (N, c, E) ≤ cj − bj (N, c, E). As R is order preserving, it follows that Ri(N, b, E) ≤
Rj(N, b, E) if E ≤
∑
i bi(N, c, E) and that bi (N, c, E) + Ri(N, c − b, E −
∑
i bi(N, c, E)) ≤
bj (N, c, E) + Rj(N, c − b, E −
∑
i bi(N, c, E)) if E ≥
∑
i bi(N, c, E). Then, R
b
i(N, c, E) ≤
Rbj(N, c, E). Similarly, as R is order preserving, it follows that bi (N, c, E) − Ri(N, b, E) ≤
bj (N, c, E) − Rj(N, b, E) if E ≤
∑
i bi(N, c, E). As b is order preserving, this implies that
ci − Ri(N, b, E) ≤ cj − Rj(N, b, E) if E ≤
∑
i bi(N, c, E). Finally, as R and b are order
preserving, it follows that ci− bi (N, c, E)−Ri(N, c− b, E−
∑
i bi(N, c, E)) ≤ cj− bj (N, c, E)−
Rj(N, c−b, E−
∑
i bi(N, c, E)) if E ≥
∑
i bi(N, c, E). Thus, ci−Rbi(N, c, E) ≤ cj−Rbj(N, c, E),
which concludes the proof.
Finally, a baseline b is scale invariant if for all (N, c, E) ∈ D, and λ > 0, b (N, λc, λE) =
λb (N, c, E). Let R and b be a scale-invariant rule and baseline, respectively. Let (N, c, E) ∈ D
be given and let λ > 0 be given. Then, ifE ≤∑i bi(N, c, E), Rb(N, λc, λE) = R(N, b(N, λc, λE), λE) =
R(N, λb(N, c, E), λE) = λR(N, b(N, c, E), E) = λRb(N, c, E). Similarly, if E ≥∑i bi(N, c, E),
thenRb(N, λc, λE) = b(N, λc, λE)+R(N, λc−b(N, λc, λE), λE) = λb(N, c, E)+λR(N, b(N, c, E), E) =
λRb(N, c, E), as desired.
The following corollary, whose content is shown directly by Thomson and Yeh (2008), is a
straightforward consequence of the above proposition.
Corollary 6 Equal treatment of equals, anonymity, order preservation, and scale invariance
are preserved by Om and Ot.
5.3 Assisted preservation
We now move to a set of properties that require additional conditions on baselines, to the
consequent counterpart properties of the baselines, to be preserved. Borrowing the term from
Hokari and Thomson (2008), we refer to this aspect as assisted preservation.
Let us start with claims monotonicity. We say that an upper bound b satisfies strong
claims monotonicity if, for all (N, c, E) ∈ D and i ∈ N , ci < c′i implies bi(N, (ci, cN\{i}), E) <
bi(N, (c
′
i, cN\{i}), E) and bj(N, (ci, cN\{i}), E) = bj(N, (c′i, cN\{i}), E) for all j ∈ N \ {i}. It is not
difficult to show that claims monotonicity of R is assistedly preserved by the previous condition.
More precisely, if R is claims monotonic and b is an upper bound that satisfies strong claims
monotonicity, then Rb satisfies claims monotonicity too. A straightforward consequence from
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here is that Ot preserves claims monotonicity, as noted by Thomson and Yeh (2008).
We say that a lower bound b satisfies strong linked monotonicity if, for all (N, c, E) ∈ D and
i ∈ N , bi(N, (ci+ε, cN\{i}), E+ε) ≤ bi(N, c, E)+ε and bj(N, (ci+ε, cN\{i}), E+ε) = bj(N, c, E)
for all j ∈ N \ {i}. It is not difficult to show that linked monotonicity of R is assistedly
preserved by the previous condition. More precisely, if R satisfies linked monotonicity and b is
an lower bound that satisfies strong linked monotonicity, then Rb satisfies linked monotonicity
too, a result that can be proved directly from the previous one on claims monotonicity by
appealing to Theorem 5. A straightforward consequence from here is that Om preserves linked
monotonicity, as noted by Thomson and Yeh (2008).
As for population monotonicity, we say that an upper bound satisfies extreme population
monotonicity if, for all (N, c, E) ∈ D and (N ′, c′, E) ∈ D such that N ⊆ N ′ and c′N = c, then
bi (N
′, c′, E) = bi (N, c, E), for all i ∈ N . It is not difficult to see that if R satisfies population
monotonicity and b is an upper bound that satisfies extreme population monotonicity, then Rb
satisfies population monotonicity too. Consequently, thanks to Theorem 5, we also have that
the dual of population monotonicity (i.e., resource-and-population monotonicity) is assistedly
preserved by a lower bound b, provided this bound satisfies the dual property of extreme pop-
ulation monotonicity described above. Note that, as the truncated claims application satisfies
extreme population monotonicity, it follows from the above that population monotonicity is
preserved by the Ot, whereas resource-and-population monotonicity is preserved by the Om, as
noted by Thomson and Yeh (2008).
The previous discussion can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 3 Claims monotonicity, linked monotonicity, population monotonicity and resource-
and-population monotonicity are assistedly preserved.
The following corollary, whose content is shown directly by Thomson and Yeh (2008) is a
straightforward consequence of the above proposition and the preceding discussion.
Corollary 7 Claims monotonicity and population monotonicity are preserved by Ot, whereas
linked monotonicity and resource-and-population monotonicity are preserved by Om.
5.4 No preservation
The remaining properties described above are highly disruptive. This is certainly the case of
the two composition properties, which might be somewhat surprisingly given the underlying
19
connection between these properties and the composition operators. Something similar happens
with resource monotonicity, consistency, resource-and-population uniformity, and self-duality.
The reason for such a disruptive behavior in all these cases is that the effect of each of these
properties on the baseline and the primitive rule cannot be disentangled, in contrast with the
properties analyzed in the previous section.
We conclude referring to the properties dealing with the immunity of rules to coalitional
manipulation. It is well known that the proportional rule is essentially the only non-manipulable
rule (e.g., Ju et al., 2007).14 It follows from here that if the proportional rule is not a fixed point
of a given composition operator, then such operator does not preserve any of the properties of
non manipulability. That is certainly the case of Om and Ot, as mentioned by Thomson and
Yeh (2008).
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